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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether Defendant Jill Lecheminant's admission that she misled Al-Bahadli regarding her
intent to give up Al-Bahadli's child for adoption constituted an issue of material fact thus
requiring that the Trial Court's Order granting Defendant LDS Family Services' Summary
Judgment Motion be reversed. Standard of Review: Standard of Review: Questions of law and
constitutionality are reviewed for correctness. Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882
P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994); Society of Separationists. Inc. v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993).
This issue was preserved by filing the Notice of Appeal within 30 days of the Trial Court's Order
being entered Legal Index (hereinafter "R") p. 116.
DETERMmmVE LAW
United States Constitution, 14th Amendment
UCA §78-30-4.13
UCA §78-30-4.14(5)
UCA §78-30-4.15
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order of William B. Bohling, Third District Court Judge, which
granted Defendant LDS Family Services' Motion for Summary Judgment. The issue in this case
is whether the Utah Supreme Court's holding in In Re Adoption of Baby Doe, 717 P.2d 690
(Utah 1986) applies to the facts of this case. In Baby Doe, the Supreme Court held that when a
biological father, through the misrepresentations of the natural mother, is denied a "reasonable
4

opportunity" to comply with the statutory requirements for protecting hisrights(UCA §78-30-413), the statute (UCA §78-30-4.14(5)) is unconstitutional as applied. Baby Doe, at 690, 691. In
this case, Al-Bahadli has alleged, and Defendant Lecheminant (the birth mother) has admitted,
that Al-Bahadli was misled by the birth mother, and therefore, he was denied a reasonable
opportunity to comply with the requirements of UCA §78-30-4.13. Therefore, UCA §78-304.14(5) is unconstitutional as applied in his case. The Trial Court granted Defendant LDS Family
Services' Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Al-Bahadli's Complaint for Paternity,
Custody and Support. In addition, UCA §78-30-4.15(2) is unconstitutional on its face and should
be stricken by the Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. Al-Bahadli is the father of Adam Lecheminant, born August 10th, 1999. R 4,1J1.
2. Defendant LeCheminant is Adam's mother. R 2,1J6.
3. Prior to Adam's birth, Plaintiff Al-Bahadli and LeCheminant agreed to marry. Adam's premature birth delayed the partie's plans to marry. R 87,1J17.
4. After Adam was conceived, and up until Adam was placed for adoption with Defendant LDS
Family Services, Defendant LeCheminant never consulted with Al-Bahadli about the
possibility of giving Al-Bahadli's son away. R 86-88, ^8,1fl0,1f23,1f24,1J25.
5. Caroline Chudley, social worker for Defendant LDS Family Services told Defendant
LeCheminant not to discuss adoption with Al-Bahadli. R 88, ^{23 and 1J27.
6. Caroline Chudley spoke with Al-Bahadli on October 18th, 1999, but never discussed adoption.
R51,f6.
7. During the pregnancy, LeCheminant attended several group meetings or classes regarding
5

options for the baby, including adoption. R 39, 1J6. However, LeCheminant misrepresented
to Al-Bahadli the purpose of the classes she was attending. She told Al-Bahadli it was a class
for new mothers, not a class for mothers who intend to give up their children for adoption. R
86H9.
8. Al-Bahadli was present at the hospital during LeCheminant's labor and during Adam's birth.
R 87, Ull.
9. Al-Bahadli provided money, clothing, toys and gifts for Adam. R 87,1fl9.
10. Adam was born pre-mature, and was in the hospital from August 10th, 1999, until November
9th, 1999. R4,1f2.
11. Al-Bahadli visited his son every day while Adam was in the hospital. R 4,1J3.
12. During Al-Bahadli's visits with Adam, Defendant LeCheminant was usually present; often her
parents were present. R 4,1J4.
13. During the hospital visits, subsequent to Adam's birth, Al-Bahadli and Lecheminant continued
to plan for their wedding. R 4,1J5.
14. Upon learning that Adam had been placed for adoption, Al-Bahadli filed for paternity in the
Third District Court, December 1st, 1999. R 1.
15. Al-Bahadli also registered with Bureau of Vital Statistics. R 51,1f8.
16. On December 1st, 1999, Al-Bahadli moved to join Defendant LDS Family Services as a party,
and for an order of temporary custody. R9.
17. On January 7th, 2000, Defendant LDS Family Services moved for summary judgment alleging
that Al-Bahadli had not complied with UCA 78-30-4.13 in a timely manner. R 26.
18. On May 16th, 2000, Judge William B. Bohling entered his order granting Defendant's motion
6

for Summary Judgment. Al-Bahadli now appeals. R 112.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant LeCheminant admits that she misled Al-Bahadli about her intentions to give up
their child for adoption. Baby Doe holds that such a misrepresentation effectively denies a father
a "reasonable opportunity" to comply with the statutory requirements for protecting his rights
(UCA §78-30-4.13), and that, in such a case, the statutory scheme (including UCA 78-304.14(5)) is unconstitutional as applied. The Trial Court ignored the Utah Supreme Court's
holding in Baby Doe and dismissed Al-Bahadli's complaint for failure to comply with UCA §7830-4.13. The Trial Court's Order should be reversed and the case set for trial.
In addition, UCA §78-30-4.15 directly contradicts the principles enunciated in Baby Doe
and should be stricken as unconstitutional on its face.
ARGUMENT
I.

AL-BAHADLI DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO
COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE, AND TO THEREBY PROTECT HIS RIGHTS,
AND THEREFORE THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED IN
HIS CASE.

Standard of Review
Questions of law and constitutionality are reviewed for correctness. Erickson v.
Schenkers Int'l Forwarders. Inc.. 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994); Society of Separationists. Inc. v.
Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993).
According to the Utah Supreme Court, although a statute may be constitutional on its
face, it may also be unconstitutional as applied in a particular case. Ellis v. Social Services
Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980); In
Re Adoption of Babv Doe. 717 P.2d 690 (Utah 1986). Furthermore, when a biological father,
7

through the misrepresentations of the natural mother, is denied a "reasonable opportunity" to
comply with the statutory requirements for protecting his rights, the statute is unconstitutional as
applied. In Re Adoption of Baby Doe, at 690, 691.1 The father in this case now before the
Court, was misled by the birth mother and was thus denied an opportunity to comply with the
statute.
In Baby Doe, the parents resided in California. The natural mother told the father that she
would move to Arizona with him and the plan was to move prior to the birth of the baby. Instead,
the mother moved to Utah and placed the child for adoption. After learning of the pending
adoption, the father filed a motion to set aside the order terminating his rights. The trial court
denied his motion, and the father appealed.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[b]y making those representations, the
child's mother alleviated any concern appellant might otherwise have had as to his need to protect
his parental rights because he had no reason to believe an adoption would be attempted." Id. at
690. Additionally, the Court found that all parties were "distinctly aware of appellant's intent and
desire to rear the child, and the record indicates that the mother's family deliberately withheld
information in order to avoid potential 'problems' with appellant, who they knew would obstruct
the adoption." Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that, because the mother had misrepresented
her intentions, the father did not have a reasonable opportunity to protect his rights, and the trial
court's decision was reversed
In the case now before this Court, after the Al-Bahadi and LeCheminant learned

1 This principle was reaffirmed in Swavne v. L.D.S Social Services. 795 P.2d 637,642 (Utah 1990), wherein the Utah
Supreme Court held that if the father was unaware of the need to protect his parental rights, and if he had been misled
concerning the need to protect those rights, then the statute is unconstitutional as applied to that father.
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LeCheminant was pregnant, they agreed to marry, all the while she was attending classes and
planning to place the child for adoption. LeCheminant, her family, and her Social Worker,
Carolyn Chudley, conspired to withhold the truth from Al-Bahadli about LeCheminant's intention
to place the child for adoption. When confronted by Al-Bahadli as to the nature of the adoption
classes she was attending, LeCheminant misled Al-Bahadli as to their purpose, and dissuaded him
from attending. She never discussed adoption with Al-Bahadli. She also knew that he was from
Iraq, and that his cultural background would cause him to oppose the idea.
After the child's pre-mature birth, and while the child was in the hospital due to
complications, Al-Bahadli visited the child every day, and visited with LeCheminant and her
parents at the hospital. During this time, Lecheminant never informed Al-Bahadli of her
intentions to give away their son. They continued to discuss their plans to marry and to raise
Adam, and she thus "alleviated" any concerns he might have had about protecting his rights.
Because of LeCheminant's actions, and misrepresentations, Al-Bahadli believed they would marry
and raise their son. Moreover, LeCheminant's family was distinctly aware of Al-Bahadli's intent
and desire to raise his son, and the record indicates that the LeCheminant's family deliberately
withheld information from Al-Bahadli regarding the pending adoption. Al-Bahadli, therefore,
never had a reasonable opportunity to comply with UCA §78-30-4.13 and protect his rights. The
statutory scheme, therefore, is unconstitutional as applied to Al-Bahadli. These are material facts
supporting genuine issues. Defendant LDS Family Services was not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The Trial Court's Order dismissing Al-Bahadli's complaint should be reversed, and
the case should be set for trial.
H.

UCA §78-30-4.15 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE IN THAT IT
PERMITS FATHERS TO BE DENIED A REASONABLE OPPORTUNTITY
9

TO COMPLY WITH UCA §78-30-4.13 BY ALLOWING THE MOTHER TO
COMMIT FRAUD.
Questions of law and constitutionality are reviewed for correctness. Erickson v.
Schenkers Int'l Forwarders. Inc.. 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994); Society of Separationists. Inc. v.
Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993).
UCA §78-30-4.15 is in direct violation of the principles enunciated in Baby Doe. The
statute states:
Any person injured byfraudulentrepresentations or actions in connection with an
adoption is entitled to pursue civil or criminal penalties in accordance with existing law. A
fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict compliance with the requirements of
this chapter, and is not a basis for dismissal of a petition for adoption, vacation of an
adoption decree, or an automatic grant of custody to the offended party.
UCA §78-30-4.15(2). The above statute directly contradicts the Supreme Court's guarantee of a
"reasonable opportunity" to comply with the provisions of §78-30-4.13, and is, therefore,
unconstitutional on its face. The statute should be stricken.
CONCLUSION
There exist genuine issues of material fact, which are in dispute. LeCheminant's
admission that misrepresented her intentions to Al-Bahadli should have been enough to defeat
Defendant LDS Family Services' Motion for Summary Judgment. It is clearfromthe affidavits
and pleadings filed in this action that there are genuine issues of material fact, and Al-Bahadli
deserves to be heard.
DATED this

day of

Z^7

*u

, 2001.

StevenC. Rus&fl
Attorney for Plaintiff?Appellant
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ORDER
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MAHAOUD AL-BAHADLI,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 994907742
vs.

LDS FAMILY SERVICES and JILL
LECHEMINANT,

Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment came on for hearing on March 31,2000.
Plaintiff was represented by Steven C. Russell; defendant LDS Family Services was represented
by Merrill F. Nelson; and defendant Jill LeCheminant was represented by D. Bruce Oliver. The
Court, having fully considered the written memoranda and oral arguments of the parties, hereby
enters the following order:

00112

1. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The material facts in defendants'
statement of undisputed material facts are deemed admitted because plaintiff failed to
specifically controvert any of those facts in his opposing memorandum.
2. Plaintiff did not properly allege fraud by defendant Jill LeCheminant. Alternatively,
plaintiff presented no evidence of fraud.
3. Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b).
4. Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b) is constitutional as applied to plaintiff. Plaintiff had
adequate opportunity to comply with the statute, and statutory compliance was not impossible.
5. Plaintiff is presumed to know the law, including his rights and obligations under the
law. Plaintiffs asserted ignorance j3f the law does not excuse him from compliance with the law.
6. Utah law provides a fair and reasonable balance of the competing rights and interests
of the various participants in the adoption of a nonmarital child. The state has a compelling
interest in the prompt and permanent placement of such a child with adoptive parents who will
assume parental responsibility for the child and provide the needs of the child. The unwed
mother, Jill LeCheminant, has a constitutional right of privacy to make timely and appropriate
decisions regarding herself and the future of the child. The child has a right to stability and
permanence in the adoptive placement. Plaintiff, an unwed father, has an inchoate, opportunity
interest that may be lost by his failure to comply strictly with statutory requirements. Those
requirements are clear and definitive, and plaintiff has the duty to protect his own rights and
interests. The mother, the adoption agency, and the adoptive parents are entitled to rely on those

2
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clear statutory procedures in determining the rights of the unwed father and deciding whether to
proceed with an adoption of the child.
7. By failing to comply with the requirements of section 78-30-4.14(2)(b), plaintiff is
deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child, and his consent to
adoption of the child is not required.
8. Plaintiff has no rights, and is entitled to no relief, in relation to the child.
9. The facial constitutionality of section 78-30-4.15(2) is not properly raised, is not in
issue, and plaintiff has no standing to raise the issue.
10. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and their motion for summary
judgment is granted.

16

-%**

DATED this _/ b _ day of Ape^ 2000.
BY THE (?OTTDT

William B. Bohling
District Court Judge

3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this / O'^day of April, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
G. Brent Smith
Steven C. Russell
AFFORDABLE LEGAL ADVOCATES
180 South 300 West, Suite 170
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
D. Bruce Oliver
180 South 300 West, Suit 210
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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(d) An unmarried biological father has the primary
responsibility to protect his rights.
(e) An unmarried biological father is presumed to know
&<%t the child may be adopted without his consent unless
be strictly complies with the provisions of this chapter,
manifests a prompt and full commitment to his parental
responsibilities, and establishes paternity.
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried mother has a
right of privacy with regard to her pregnancy and adoption
plan, and therefore has no legal obligation to disclose the
identity of an unmarried biological father prior to or during an
adoption proceeding, and has no obligation to volunteer information to the court with respect to the father.
1995

59 8

(5) The notice required by this section may be s e r v ^
immediately after relinquishment or execution of consent, b^t
shall be served at least 30 days prior to the final disposition^
bearing. The notice shall specifically state that the perso n
Served must respond to the petition within 30 days of servie e
if he intends to intervene in or contest the adoption.
(6) (a) Any person who has been served with notice of a^
adoption proceeding and who wishes to contest the adop.
tion shall file a motion in the adoption proceeding withi n
30 days after service. The motion shall set forth specify
relief sought and be accompanied by a memorandum
specifying the factual and legal grounds upon which the
motion is based.
(b) Any person who fails to file a motion for relief
78-30-4.13. Notice of adoption proceedings.
within 30 days after service of notice waives any right to
(1) An unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that
further notice in connection with the adoption, forfeits all
he has engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is
rights in relation to the adoptee, and is barred frotn
deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption
thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to asse^
proceeding regarding that child may occur, and has a duty to
any interest in the adoptee.
protect his own rights and interests. He is therefore entitled to
(7) Service of notice under this section shall be made a.s
actual notice of a birth or an adoption proceeding with regard
follows:
to that child only as provided in this section.
(a) With regard to a person whose consent is necessary
(2) Notice of an adoption proceeding shall be served on each
under Section 78-30-4.14, service shall be in accordance
of the following persons:
with the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(a) any person or agency whose consent or relinquishIf service is by publication, the court shall designate the
ment is required under Section 78-30-4.14 unless that
content of the notice regarding the identity of the parties.
right has been terminated by waiver,
relinquishment,
The notice may not include the name of the person or
consent, or judicial action;
persons seeking to adopt the adoptee.
(k>) any person who has initiated a paternity proceeding
(b) As to any other person for whom notice is require^
an4 filed notice of that action with the state registrar of
under this section, service by certified mail, return receipt
vital statistics within the Department of Health, in accorrequested, is sufficient. If that service cannot be comdance with Subsection (3);
pleted after two attempts, the court may issue an order
(CO any legally appointed custodian or guardian of the
providing for service by publication, posting, or by any
adoptee;
other manner of service.
(<i) the petitioner's spouse, if any, only if he has not
(c) Notice to a person who has initiated a paternity
joined in the petition;
y"
proceeding and filed notice of that action with the stat$
($) the adoptee's spouse, if any;
registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health in
(f) any person who is recorded on the birth certificate
accordance with the requirements of Subsection (3), shall
as the child's father, with the knowledge and consent of
be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, at
the mother;
the last address filed with the registrar.
(§) any person who is openly living in the same house(8) The notice required by this section may be waived n\
hold with the child at the time the consent is executed or writing by the person entitled to receive notice.
relinquishment made, and who is holding himself out to
(9) Proof of service of notice on all persons for whom notice
be the child's father; and
is required by this section shall be filed with the court before
(h) any person who is married to the child's mother at
the final dispositional hearing on the adoption.
the time she executes her consent to the adoption or
(10) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither
relinquishes the child for adoption.
the notice of an adoption proceeding nor any process in that
(3) (a) In order to preserve any right to notice and consent,
Proceeding is required to contain the name of the person Or
an Unmarried biological father may initiate proceedings
Persons seeking to adopt the adoptee.
to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uni(11) Except as to those persons whose consent to an adopSjrnj Act on Paternity and die a notice of the initiation of
tion is required under Section 78-30-4.14, the sole purpose of
tho^e proceedings with the state registrar of vital statisnotice under this section is to enable the person served tc>
tics within the Department of Health prior to the mother's
intervene in the adoption and present evidence to the court
execution of consent or her relinquishment to an agency.
relevant to the best interest of the child.
19^
That action and notice may also be filed prior to the child's
7^-30-4.14.
Necessary
consent
to
adoption
or
relins
birth.
quishment for adoption.
(h) If the unmarried biological father does not know the
(1) Either relinquishment for adoption to a licensed child-,
couiity in which the birth mother resides, he may initiate
placing agency or consent to adoption is required from:
bis action in any county, subject to a change in trial
(a) the adoptee, if he is more than 12 years of age^
pursuant to Section 78-13-7.
unless he does not have the mental capacity to consent;
(c) The Department of Health shall provide forms for
the purpose of filing the notice described in Subsection
(b) both parents or the surviving parent of an adopted
(3)(ci), and make those forms available in the office of the
who was conceived or born within a marriage, unless th$
couiity clerk in each county, every health care facility, as
adoptee is 18 years of age or older;
defined in Section 26-21-2, and licensed child-placing
(c) the mother of an adoptee born outside of marriage*
ageiicy.
(d) any biological parent who has been adjudicated to
(4) Notice provided in accordance with this section need not
be the child's biological father by a court of. competent
disclose the name of the mother of the child who is the subject
jurisdiction prior to the mother's execution of consent o*
of an adoption proceeding.
her relinquishment to an agency for adoption;
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(e) any biological parent who has executed a voluntary
declaration of paternity in accordance with Title 78,
Chapter 45e, prior to the mother's execution of consent or
her relinquishment to an agency for adoption;
(f) an unmarried biological father of an adoptee, as
defined in Section 78-30-4.11, only if the requirements
and conditions of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) have been
proven; and
(g) the licensed child-placing agency to whom an
adoptee has been relinquished and that is placing the
child for adoption.
(2) In accordance with Subsection (1), the consent of an
unmarried biological father is necessary only ifthe father has
strictly complied with the requirements of this section.
(a) (i) With regard to a child who is placed with adoptive parents more than six months after birth, an
unmarried biological father shall have developed a
substantial relationship with the child, taken some
measure of responsibility for the child and the child's
future, and demonstrated a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by financial support of
the child, of a fair and reasonable sum and in accordance with the father's ability, when not prevented
from doing so by the person or authorized agency
having lawful custody of the child, and either:
(A) visiting the child at least monthly when
physically and financially able to do so, and when
not prevented from doing so by the person or
authorized agency having lawful custody of the
child; or
(B) regular communication with the child or
with the person or agency having the care or
custody of the child, when physically and financially unable to visit the child, and when not
prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawfuT custody of the child.
(ii) The subjective intent of an unmarried biological father, whether expressed or otherwise, unsupported by evidence of acts specified in this subsection
shall not preclude a determination that the father
failed to meet the requirements of this subsection.
(iii) An unmarried biological father who openly
lived with the child for a period of six months within
the one-year period after the birth of the child and
immediately preceding placement of the child with
adoptive parents, and openly held himself out to be
the father of the child during that period, shall be
deemed to have developed a substantial relationship
with the child and to have otherwise met the requirements of this subsection.
(b) With regard to a child who is under six months of
age at the time he is placed with adoptive parents, an
unmarried biological father shall have manifested a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in this subsection prior to the
time the mother executes her consent for adoption or
relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency.
The father shall:
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity,
and file with that court a sworn affidavit stating that
he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the
child, setting forth his plans for care of the child, and
agreeing to a court order of child support and the
payment of expenses incurred in connection with the
mother's pregnancy and the child's birth;
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity
proceedings with the state registrar of vital statistics
within the Department of Health, in a confidential
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registry established by the department for that purpose; and
(iii) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy,
paid a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses
incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy
and the child's birth, in accordance with his means,
and when not prevented from doing so by the person
or authorized agency having lawful custody of the
child.
(3) An unmarried biological father whose consent is required under Subsection (1) or (2) may nevertheless lose his
right to consent ifthe court determines, in accordance with the
requirements and procedures of Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 4,
Termination of Parental Rights Act, that his rights should be
terminated, based on the petition of any interested party.
(4) If there is no showing that an unmarried biological
father has consented to or waived his rights regarding a
proposed adoption, the petitioner shall file with the court a
certificate from the state registrar of vital statistics within the
Department of Health, stating that a diligent search has been
made of the registry of notices from unmarried biological
fathers described in Subsection (2)(b)(ii), and that no filing has
been found pertaining to the father of the child in question, or
if a filing is found, stating the name of the putative father and
the time and date of filing. That certificate shall be filed with
the court prior to entrance of a final decree of adoption.
(5) An unmarried biological father who does not fully and
strictly comply with each of the conditions provided in this
section, is deemed to have waived and surrendered any right
in relation to the child, including the right to notice of any
judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the
child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not
required.
1995
78-30-4.15. Responsibility of e a c h party for their o w n
actions — Fraud or misrepresentation —
Statutory compliance.
(1) Each parent of a child conceived or born outside of
marriage is responsible for his or her own actions and is not
excused from strict compliance with the provisions of this
chapter based upon any action, statement, or omission of the
other parent or third parties.
(2) Any person injured by fraudulent representations or
actions in connection with an adoption is entitled to pursue
civil or criminal penalties in accordance with existing law. A
fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict compliance
with the requirements of this chapter, and is not a basis for
dismissal of a petition for adoption, vacation of an adoption
decree, or an automatic grant of custody to the offended party.
Custody determinations shall be based on the best interest of
the child, in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-304.16.
(3) The Legislature finds no practical way to remove all risk
of fraud or misrepresentation in adoption proceedings, and
has provided a method for absolute protection of an unmarried
biological father's rights by compliance with the provisions of
this chapter. In balancing the rights and interests of the state,
and of all parties affected by fraud, specifically the child, the
adoptive parents, and the unmarried biological father, the
Legislature has determined that the unmarried biological
father is in the best position to prevent or ameliorate the
effects of fraud and that, therefore, the burden of fraud shall
be borne by him.
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried biological
father who resides in another state may not, in every circumstance, be reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly
comply with, the requirements of this chapter. Therefore when
all of the following requirements have been met, t h a t unmarried biological father may contest an adoption, prior to finalization of the decree of adoption, and assert his interest in the
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child; the court may then, in its discretion, proceed with an
evidentiary hearing under Subsection 78-30-4.16(2):
(a) the unmarried biological father resides and has
resided in another state where the unmarried mother was
also located or resided;
(b) the mother left that state without notifying or
informing the unmarried biological father that she could
be located in the state of Utah;
(c) the unmarried biological father has, through every
reasonable means, attempted to locate the mother but
does not know or have reason to know that the mother is
residing in the state of Utah; and
(d) the unmarried biological father has complied with
the most stringent and complete requirements of the state
where the mother previously resided or was located, in
order to protect and preserve his parental interest and
right in the child in cases of adoption.
1998
78-30-4.16. Contested adoptions — Rights of parties —
Determination of custody.
(1) Whenever any party contests an adoption, the court
shall first determine whether the provisions of this chapter
have been complied with. If a party who was entitled to notice
and consent under the provisions of this chapter, was denied
that right, and did not otherwise waive or forfeit that right
under the terms of this chapter, the court may:
(a) enjoin the adoption, or dismiss the adoption petition, and proceed in accordance with Subsection (2); or
(b) determine whether proper grounds for termination
of that parent's rights exist and, if so, order that the
parent's rights be terminated in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 4,
Termination of Parental Rights Act.
(2) (a) In any case, and under any circumstance, if a court
determines that a petition for adoption may not be
granted, the court may not automatically grant custody of
a child to a challenging -biological parent, but shall conduct an evidentiary hearing in each case, in order to
determine who should have custody of the child, in
accordance with the child's best interest.
(b) Evidence considered at that hearing may include,
but is not limited to, evidence of psychological or emotional bonds that the child had formed with third parties
and any detriment that a change in custody may cause to
the child. The fact that a person relinquished a child to a
licensed child placing agency or executed a consent for
adoption may not be considered by the court as evidence of
neglect or abandonment.
(c) Any custody order entered pursuant to this section
may also include provisions for visitation by a biological
parent or interested third party, and provide for the
financial support of the child.
(3) An adoption may not be contested after the final decree
of adoption is entered.
1995
78-30-4.17. P a r e n t s w h o s e rights have been terminated.
Neither notice nor consent to adoption or relinquishment for
adoption is required from a parent whose rights with regard to
an adoptee have been terminated by a court.
1995
78-30-4.18. P e r s o n s w h o may take consents and relinquishments.
(1) A consent or relinquishment by a birth mother or an
adoptee shall be signed or confirmed under oath before:
(a) a judge of any court that has jurisdiction over
adoption proceedings, or a public officer appointed by that
judge for the purpose of taking consents or relinquishments; or
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(b) a person who is authorized by a licensed ch'U
placing agency to take consents or relinquishments
long as the signature is notarized or witnessed by t ^
individuals who are not members of the birth mothe '°
immediate family and who are not affiliated with th
e
licensed child-placing agency.
(2) If the consent or relinquishment of a birth mother o
adoptee is taken out of state it shall be signed or confirmed
under oath before:
(a) a person who is authorized by a child-placing
agency licensed by that state to take consents or relinquishments; or
(b) a person authorized or appointed to take consents
or relinquishments by a court of this state that has
jurisdiction over adoption proceedings, or a court of that
state that has jurisdiction over adoption proceedings.
(3) The consent or relinquishment of any other person or
agency as required by Section 78-30-4.14 may be signed before
a Notary Public or any person authorized to take a consent or
relinquishment under Subsection (1) or (2).
(4) A person, authorized by Subsection (1) or (2) to take
consents or relinquishments, shall certify to the best of his
information and belief that the person executing the consent
or relinquishment has read and understands the consent or
relinquishment and has signed it freely and voluntarily.
(5) A person executing a consent or relinquishment is
entitled to a copy of the consent or relinquishment.
1995
78-30-4.19. Time period prior to birth mother's consent.
A birth mother may not consent to the adoption of her child
or relinquish control or custody of her child until at least 24
hours after the birth of her child.
1995
78-30-4.20. When consent or relinquishment effective.
A consent or relinquishment is effective when it is signed
and may not be revoked.
1995
78-30-4.21. P o w e r of a minor to consent or relinquish.
A minor parent has the power to consent to the adoption of
his or her child and has the power to relinquish his or her
control or custody of the child to a licensed child-placing
agency. That consent or relinquishment is valid and has the
same force and effect as a consent or relinquishment executed
by an adult parent. A minor parent, having executed a consent
or relinquishment, cannot revoke that consent upon reaching
the age of majority or otherwise becoming emancipated. 1995
78-30-4.22. Custody pending final decree.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by the court, once a
petitioner has received the adoptee into his home and a
petition for adoption has been filed, the petitioner is entitled to
the custody and control of the adoptee and is responsible for
the care, maintenance, and support of the adoptee, including
any necessary medical or surgical treatment, pending further
order of the court.
(2) Once a child has been placed with, relinquished to, or
ordered into the custody of a licensed child-placing agency for
purposes of adoption, the agency shall have custody and
control of the child and is responsible for his care, maintenance, and support. The agency may delegate the responsibility for care, maintenance, and support, including any necessary medical or surgical treatment, to the petitioner once the
petitioner has received the child into his home. However, until
the final decree of adoption is entered by the court, the agency
has the right to the custody and control of the child.
1995
78-30-4.23. Criminal sexual offenses.
The notice and consent provisions of this chapter do not
apply in cases where the child is conceived as a result of any
sexual offense described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4.
1995

